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
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
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
Monterey, California



THESIS

AN EVALUATION OF WHETHER THE NEW MANNING  
SYSTEM SHOULD AND/OR COULD BE APPLIED  
TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS

by

Daniel E. Oliver  
and  
David J. Buehler

December 1983

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
AD-A139943		
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) An Evaluation of Whether the New Manning System Should and/or Could be Applied to the Adjutant General Corps		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis December 1983
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Daniel E. Oliver and David J. Buehler		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		12. REPORT DATE December 1983
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 111
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) New Manning System, cohesion, regimental system, Adjutant General Corps, regional basing		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) → The Chief of Staff of the Army decided that the New Manning System could improve cohesion, teamwork, and combat effectiveness through the use of the unit replacement system, coupled with the regimental system, instead of the individual replacement system. Presently, the New Manning System is being applied exclusively to the combat arms branches. This research reviews the primary features of the New Manning System and the British Regimental System and the effects of cohesion. This research also discusses why it is not ---		

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An Evaluation of Whether the New Manning  
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to the Adjutant General Corps

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

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## ABSTRACT

The Chief of Staff of the Army decided that the New Manning System could improve cohesion, teamwork, and combat effectiveness through the use of the unit replacement system, coupled with the regimental system, instead of the individual replacement system. Presently, the New Manning System is being applied exclusively to the combat arms branches. This research reviews the primary features of the New Manning System and the British Regimental system and the effects of cohesion. This research also discusses why it is not feasible to apply the principles of the New Manning System, in its present configuration, to the Adjutant General Corps. The New Manning System is then modified to provide the Adjutant General Corps with a branch regiment, functionally grouped battalions within this regiment, and geographical regions for the battalions.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Adjutant General Corps (AGC) is a combat service support branch with varied organizational structures, diverse missions, and unique operational procedures in units located around the world. Since the New Manning System (NMS) is presently oriented to combat arms branches, it does not apply to the AGC. Because of the career development policy that requires officers to be proficient in two specialties and the narrow pyramidal officer grade structure at battalion level, the NMS is likely to be more beneficial to enlisted personnel. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to determine whether the principles of the New Manning System should and/or could be applied to the enlisted personnel in the Adjutant General Corps.

The four basic features of the New Manning System are stabilization, unit replacement, establishment of permanent regiments, and establishment of regimental homebases. Stabilization and unit replacement are combined to form the unit replacement system known as Project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training). Stabilization means that personnel will be stabilized in one unit, as a group, for a definite period of time, part of which may be overseas. The Manning System Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10] states that unit replacement means overseas requirements will be met by deploying the entire unit. The establishment of permanent regiments and their homebases combine to form the U.S. Army regimental system. The Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 11] identifies a regiment as a non-tactical organization that "consists of a grouping of like-type battalions . . . that can be interchangeable and facilitate (sic) unit replacement." Regiments will consist of between three and

seven battalions located both in the Continental United States (CCNUS) and in places outside the Continental United States (CCCNUS). Each regiment will have its headquarters permanently located at an installation in CONUS, which will be the regiment's homebase.

In addition to increasing cohesion and combat effectiveness, stabilization and unit replacement will narrow the professional circle for the soldier and allow both the soldier and his or her family to build lasting friendships. Homebasing will afford spouses an opportunity to develop a career of their own and give the soldiers and their families a better idea of where they would be stationed in the future, as well as provide support systems for families. Therefore, Legge and Andrews [Ref. 2: p. 207] believe that the quality of life will be improved by strengthening the social, religious, educational, and recreational ties between military and civilian families in a hometown setting.

A concern is that, since the New Manning System presently pertains to the combat arms only, the benefits of the NMS will be limited to the combat arms soldiers. Failure to provide support soldiers many of the same benefits may result in dissension and degradation of morale and readiness in support soldiers. Yet, because of the structure, mission, and local procedures of AGC units, the New Manning System, in its present configuration, cannot be applied to the AGC. In order to increase cohesion and stability for the AGC soldiers, the present assignment policy of individual replacement to world-wide locations must be modified. If the features of the New Manning System cannot be used, then what policies should be developed in order to provide the AGC soldiers many of the same benefits which the combat soldiers are receiving? This thesis addresses whether the principles of the NMS should be applied to the enlisted

personnel in the AGC; if so, how; and whether applying these principles meets the needs of the Army, the objectives of the NMS, and the needs and desires of the AGC soldiers.

## II. MILITARY COHESION

Recognizing that cohesion plays a vital part in any army's ability to function effectively, the definition and characteristics of cohesion warrant examination. This chapter will be a concentrated look at cohesion's vital parts and their impact on modern day forces.

### A. WHAT IS COHESION?

According to Cartwright and Zander [Ref. 3: p. 91], cohesion is "the degree to which the members of a group desire to remain in the group." From this definition, it would appear that members of a highly cohesive group, when compared with members of a group with low cohesion, are more concerned with their membership, are more apt to contribute to the group's welfare, and tend to be more active in group events. Furthermore, Cartwright and Zander [Ref. 3: p. 91] maintain that "cohesiveness contributes to a group's potency and vitality; it increases the significance of membership for those who belong to the group." Basically then, cohesion involves a process which requires interaction between individuals within a group, and results in the formation of feelings which closely bond individual members to the group.

Now that cohesion has been defined, what are some of its characteristics? Ingraham and Manning [Ref. 4: p. 6] identify some as being mutual affection, interdependence, trust and loyalty to other group members. In more common military terminology, Braun [Ref. 5: p. 13] says, "Cohesion involves group pride, group solidarity, group loyalty, team spirit, and teamwork." Based on its definition and characteristics, it would seem that cohesion is the glue that binds unit

members together, transforming them into a more tightly knit and formidable force than a similar unit lacking cohesion.

#### B. HOW DOES COHESION WORK?

This is an important question and must be clarified if the reader is to gain an understanding of cohesion. Braun [Ref. 5: p. 22] indicates that two strong psychological forces which contribute to the development of cohesion are at work on group members: individual motivation, and group norms. Since individual motivation does not always conform to group norms, stress may result, reducing the bond between the individual and the group. Ideally, these individual motivations and group norms are compatible, thereby reducing any stress experienced by the individual and drawing him closer to the group. It has been found that by the reduction of this stress level, a positive atmosphere is created that is conducive to the development of a strong cohesive bond between the group and its members. Given the correct climate, this new formation of cohesion tends to reinforce group norms, further strengthening the group's psychological hold over its members and perpetuates the development of stronger unit cohesion.

Another factor that is extremely important to the establishment of cohesion is the participants' relationships to their primary group. Some examples of these common primary groups to which people might belong are the family, church or military unit. Primary groups are often homogeneous in nature and are comprised of individuals that have shared values and ideas, work together on a daily basis, and lend support to one another. Due to these strong psychological forces involved, primary groups have a strong and lasting impact on their members' lives, and ties with these groups are not easily severed. In part, this ability of the



primary group to bind its members together impacts on the degree of cohesion experienced by the group. In reference to the German Army during WW II, Janowitz [Ref. 6: p. 182] confirms this idea in the following statement:

In the army, when isolated from civilian primary groups, the individual soldier comes to depend more and more on his military primary group. His spontaneous loyalties are to its immediate members whom he sees daily and with whom he develops a high degree of intimacy.

Just what determines how much a person will be attracted to a group? In general, it is thought that an individual will be more attracted to a group the more favorable the expected outcomes of membership are to him. Cartwright and Zander [Ref. 3: p. 96] propose four interacting sets of variables that influence group participation:

1. Motive base for attraction, which consists of one's needs for affiliation, recognition, security, money and other values that can be afforded by groups.

2. Incentive properties of the group, consisting of its goals, programs, characteristics of its members, style of operation, prestige, or other properties of significance that impact on the individual's reasons for doing things.

3. Expectancy, the subject's perception that membership will actually have beneficial or detrimental consequences for him.

4. Comparison level, one's conception of how much the group experience should provide in comparison to how much it actually does. This means if the outcome is greater than expected, the individual will be drawn closer to the group.

Janowitz's [Ref. 6: p. 183] study of the German Wehrmacht during WW II revealed two sets of factors which impacted on primary group solidarity and ultimately on unit cohesion. He classifies the first set of these factors as being strengthening factors:

1. The Nazi nucleus of the primary group, the hard core. Although a small percentage of the group, this hard core acted as a central force that dictated group norms and acted as a stabilizing force.

2. Composition of combat units were carefully monitored to insure that a unit's members were of the same ethnic and national origin.

3. The Wehrmacht personnel replacement system was a system that operated on the concept of unit replacement. Instead of replacing casualties on an individual basis, as they occur, units were allowed to deplete their strength, and were then pulled out of combat and refitted with replacement troops and equipment. Through this method, replacement troops were afforded an opportunity to be assimilated into their new unit prior to the unit's being committed to combat.

The outcome of these actions had a positive influence and resulted in an effective force that retained its cohesive spirit well into the fading days of the war. This can be substantiated by the relatively low desertion rate experienced by the German Army. Only at the very end of the war, when units were being hastily thrown together from scattered resources, did unit cohesion start to drastically decline.

The second set of factors discussed were those that weaken primary group solidarity:

1. Isolation created stress and daily face-to-face contact with one's primary group was identified as being needed if unit cohesion was to remain strong. Soldiers isolated from their units for several days, especially if they were hungry and exposed to physical destruction, were such more easily separable members of their group than ones experiencing the same hardships, but in the presence of their primary group members. Even during the Germans'

retreat in North Africa, France and ultimately Germany, unit cohesion remained strong, and as long as the retreat was well organized, the army remained a formidable force.

2. Family ties tended to weaken military primary group bonds. As the war progressed, soldiers' ties to their military primary groups were often challenged by the members strong ties to the family. The Wehrmacht was aware of this fact and did everything it could to alleviate the soldier's concern for his family's safety. In an effort to quell soldier's concerns, families were instructed to avoid writing about any unpleasant conditions that existed in Germany. While the overall desertion rate was low, many of those that did occur happened while the soldier was at home on leave with his family. This serves to point out the strong ties the family primary group has on an individual.

3. Demand for physical survival tended to weaken primary group cohesion. It was found that the primary group's bonds of cohesion were disrupted only under the most extreme conditions of direct threat to the individual.

While primary group cohesion is a powerful force, its mere presence does not mean that a unit will be an effective force. Unless group norms, individual motivation and organizational goals are congruent, strife will exist and the unit's ability to effectively accomplish its missions will be degraded. Little [Ref. 7: p. 195] verified this when he said, "Studies of industrial organization have noted that cohesive primary groups can at times supply the basis for group opposition to the goals of management."

#### C. WHY IS COHESION IMPORTANT?

Cohesion and its effects have long been recognized as positive factors influencing military units. From his very birth, a significant portion of man's existence centers

around various primary groups. These encounters are extremely important, as they are a central part of the individual's support system and provide a place of acceptance and refuge. The degree of cohesion experienced within these groups rests with the group's ability to fulfill its members' needs and draw them together into a tightly knit unit. Ideally, as the cohesion within the group becomes stronger, individuals' feelings which initially center around themselves are supplanted by feelings about the group.

Janowitz [Ref. 6: p. 181] explained that cohesion was an important factor in German soldiers' lives and had a direct impact on their ability to fight and withstand the hardships of war. The ordinary soldier did not fight because of political or ethical schemes, but rather because he was a member of a cohesive primary group which satisfied some of his major primary needs. Furthermore, the German soldier was likely to continue fighting, even in the face of formidable odds, as long as he was well led and could give and receive affection from the other members of his squad or platoon. Even during periods of retreat and wide-spread losses, as long as the German soldier was bound by the cohesiveness of his primary group's expectations and demands, he was likely to be an effective fighting force. Marshall [Ref. 8: p. 42] reemphasized the idea about cohesion and the primary group when he said:

I hold it to one of the simplest truths of war that thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade.

While German units with high cohesion suffered very little from desertions, or individually contrived surrenders, those with low cohesion did not fair so well. Toward

the end of WW II, German units that were hastily assembled with a hodgepodge of soldiers experienced little cohesion and an above-average desertion rate. These replacements of different nationalities and backgrounds physically worked together in the same unit, but they failed to congeal into a cohesive fighting force capable of conducting effective combat operations. Marshall [Ref. 8: p. 42] expanded on this idea when he said a replacement's lack of integration into the unit often resulted "in the man's total failure in battle and his return to the rear as a mental case."

In Men Against Fire, Marshall implies that men in combat who lack strong unit cohesion are in effect merely gun bearers incapable of effective offensive combat actions. He also proposes that the battle strength of a company is derived from the composition of the company's smallest cohesive units. This suggests that cohesion must start at the unit's lowest levels and through a vehicle like Likert's [Ref. 9: p. 183] linking-pin theory, extend to the rest of the unit and to higher organizations.

The current world situation dictates that the accumulation of large amounts of money, equipment, and manpower no longer constitutes an acceptable state of preparedness. In today's complicated world, a multitude of factors figure into the U.S. Army's ability to effectively conduct combat and attain its ultimate purpose--victory. The Army has recognized this and in 1981 initiated efforts to harness one of these elusive combat multipliers known as cohesion. Colonel Ardant du Picq [Ref. 10: p. 3] stressed the importance of cohesion when he said:

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave men, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequences of mutual aid will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell.

Cohesion is an important and sometimes overlooked quantity which may well dictate whether a unit succeeds and survives or falters and perishes. Other things equal, a unit that is highly cohesive has an increased capability to retain its members over one that lacks cohesion. The greater this bond of cohesion, the greater the unit's ability to influence members' actions through their conformity to unit norms and goals. Highly cohesive units give to their members as well as take. They do this by being a source of security for their members. This relationship serves to reduce group members' stress and increase their self-esteem.

According to Tuckman [Ref. 11: p. 396] groups go through four stages of development:

1. Forming: the development of role structure and interpersonal dependencies.
2. Storming: competition for position, emotional tension, group drive.
3. Norming: the development of group norms and cohesion; pressures toward conformity.
4. Performing: productive task activity.

From this concept it appears that units which are at Tuckman's performance stage of development are better prepared to operate effectively and be more productive than a unit struggling to develop. Recognizing this, it appears evident that a group is most cohesive and productive once it attains the performing stage of group development. It is at this stage that a unit can direct the bulk of its time and energies into organization-directed tasks which focus on the improvement of combat readiness.

#### D. SUMMARY

Cohesion is not something that will solve all of the Army's problems and guarantee success in battle, but it clearly is a powerful force that needs to be tapped. Efforts by unit personnel to establish an atmosphere conducive to the formation of cohesion are essential--strong unit cohesion just does not happen by itself. The benefits are real, and a highly cohesive unit may experience an increase in performance, job satisfaction, retention rates, and overall readiness.

Faced with the possibility of a "come as you are war," the U.S. Army has been forced to make a critical evaluation of itself. In future conflicts, there may not be sufficient time for external threats to create cohesion in our fighting forces prior to their actual commitment. Therefore, units must be a cohesive, combat-ready element, capable of responding to any contingency on little or no notice.

The question then is how to get units to Tuckman's performance stage quickly, and once there, keep them there? In 1981, at the request of the Chief of Staff, the Army initiated efforts to remedy this situation and improve its readiness posture through the development and implementation of a process known as the New Manning System. This system, what it looks like, and how it functions will be discussed in Chapter 3.

### III. THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM: HOW IT WORKS

The post-Vietnam era has seen a series of new dimensions for manning the Army. The draft went out; the volunteer Army came in. The focus was on resources, efficiencies and the costs of maintaining adequate manpower in uniform. In this resource-driven environment, it was only natural that the Army would again resort to a manning system which would distribute soldiers efficiently in accordance with priorities. This individual replacement system has, and will continue, to serve the Army well; it is flexible and efficient. It eases management and puts soldiers where the Army needs them, quickly and fairly. However, it does take its toll. The constant flow of personnel into and out of units--especially combat arms units--makes it very difficult to foster cohesion and group solidarity in the small, combat arms units which are the cutting edge of the Army. [Ref. 12: p. 4]

#### Commanders Notes

In 1981, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer, "decided that combat effectiveness could be improved by adopting procedures to replace entire units, rather than individuals" [Ref. 13: p. 1]. His feelings that the individual replacement system had destroyed the sense of cohesion and training teamwork originated efforts which resulted in the New Manning System [Ref. 14: p. 20]. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the NMS encompasses two subsystems: the unit replacement system and the U.S. Army regimental system. This chapter discusses each of these systems in detail.

#### A. THE UNIT REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

Stabilization of personnel in companies is crucial in creating an atmosphere conducive to unit cohesion. Goldich [Ref. 15: p. 13] states that under the NMS, enlisted soldiers serve in the same company-size unit from the moment they begin initial entry training (IET) through the end of a 3-year cycle. First-term enlistees are recruited for a



specific COHORT unit and undergo IET as a group. When the group has completed its training, it proceeds to a unit where the group is joined by a cadre to form a stabilized unit that will train and deploy together to a location outside of the Continental United States (OCONUS) on a fixed schedule. After three years, the life cycle of the company ends and it is disestablished. Those personnel who chose not to reenlist are discharged from the active Army. Personnel who have a service obligation remaining are individually reassigned elsewhere.

Some units spend their entire life cycle in the Continental United States (CONUS), while others do not. Korea-bound units spend 24 months in CONUS before deploying on a 12-month tour unaccompanied by dependents. Units bound for Europe, Alaska, Panama, and Hawaii spend 18 months in CONUS and deploy to OCONUS for 18 months. Families may accompany the soldiers to these areas, if family housing is available. By regulation, accompanied soldiers must serve a 36-month tour OCONUS. Therefore, according to the Manning System Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 21], when their unit is disestablished at the end of 18 months OCONUS, accompanied soldiers will be individually reassigned within their current theater.

Once a unit is formed, soldiers are stabilized in the unit for a 3-year period. The personnel system is not allowed to tap this unit in order to meet demands elsewhere, nor are unit members allowed to volunteer for assignments outside of the unit. Naturally, exceptions due to health, family, or disciplinary problems will be allowed. The Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 21] believes that this "allows leaders to attain optimum training and readiness standards while fostering a greater sense of cohesion and belonging."

Goldich [Ref. 15: p. 15] states:

Stabilization and unit replacement are inextricably intertwined. Stabilization of personnel units insures that an environment more favorable toward unit cohesion is created; unit replacement is required to maintain stabilization.

According to the Manning System Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10], "This 'Project COHORT' type stabilization reduces the turbulence and cohesion problem for one assignment. But what then?" Do the soldier and his family move on to the next assignment--to another unit at a different location--to start over again?

#### B. THE U.S. ARMY REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

The answer to the above question theoretically is "No." The U.S. Army regimental system will extend the benefits of unit affiliation beyond the soldier's current tour. Between three to seven battalions of the same branch and structural configuration will be grouped together to form a regiment. These battalions will be located both in CONUS and in OCONUS. Each regiment will be homebased at a CONUS installation, where its OCONUS battalions will be stationed. The Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10] states that soldiers who are assigned to and affiliated with a regiment "will return to the same group of battalions throughout their careers, thereby reducing the scope and impersonality of assignment alternatives." The Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10] believes that, ideally, the regiment "will become the soldier's family, his home and will offer long term stability and predictability." It also feels that the system will facilitate affiliation by promoting identification with a group of units, foster cohesion by keeping soldiers together, and enhance loyalty by narrowing the circle of professional

relationships [Ref. 1: p. 10]. Goldich [Ref. 15: p. 19] says the regimental system "will attempt to generate cohesion and esprit among career officers and NCOs in the same manner that (the unit replacement system does) among first-term soldiers during their initial enlistments." According to Army magazine [Ref. 14: p. 23], "The home-basing aspect of the system should appeal particularly to career soldiers because it will enable them to put down 'roots'--buy homes, establish friendships--in the local communities where their regiment is based."

When serving with troop units, career officers and NCOs will be assigned to a battalion within their regiment. When serving in a non-troop assignment (ROTC, recruiting, reserve advisor, etc.) they will retain their regimental affiliation. The Army will attempt to assign career officers and NCOs to non-troop assignments in the general vicinity of their regimental homebase.

Combat arms soldiers who are permanently affiliated with a regiment are allowed to wear regimental accoutrements, whether they are in a troop unit or in a non-troop assignment. Combat support and combat service support soldiers assigned to combat units will not be affiliated with a regiment, but will be allowed to wear regimental uniform insignias and participate in regimental activities while they are assigned to regimental units.

### C. PERCEIVED PROBLEM AREAS

The New Manning System is by no means a panacea for reducing turbulence and increasing esprit and cohesion. In fact, several problem areas exist within the NMS. First, it is presently for combat arms soldiers only. The unit replacement system cannot be applied to combat support and combat service support units because of the differences in

lengths of IET for the various specialties in each unit. Furthermore, Goldich [Ref. 15: p. 65] states that support units are much more likely to be organized to meet local conditions, such as relying heavily on civilian personnel in CONUS, or being staffed exclusively with soldiers overseas. This causes CONUS units to be structured differently from OCONUS units and, because the regimental system groups units of the same structural configuration, prohibits the application of the regimental system to the majority of the support units.

Second, the unit replacement system will continue to use the individual replacement system at the completion of a unit's life cycle. This seems to offset the benefits of keeping soldiers together for a specific period of time, as soldiers will receive scattered assignments after their unit is disestablished, thereby losing the cohesion that has been developed.

Third, the regimental system is supposed to be oriented towards the career officers and NCOs, offering them repetitive assignments in regimental battalions. Yet, as the soldier becomes more senior in rank, there are fewer and fewer assignments at battalion level. In spite of attempts to give career soldiers non-troop assignments in the general vicinity of their regimental homebase, the soldiers probably will not be close enough to it or their professional circle to receive many, if any, of the benefits of the system.

#### D. SUMMARY

In summation, there are many purposes of the New Manning System. One purpose is to create a close and lasting relationship between the soldiers and their unit by giving the soldiers and their families greater stability, closer ties to both military and civilian communities, more

predictability and consistency in their assignment pattern, and a greater sense of control over their lives. Another purpose is to reduce turbulence and enhance esprit by fostering a new sense of belonging by giving the soldier a smaller community within the Army which he can identify with over a period of time. However, the primary purpose of the NMS is to create cohesion in combat units so that their combat effectiveness is maximized. Therefore, the NMS is presently for combat arms soldiers only, but, despite its problems, Lieutenant General Thurman [Ref. 16: p. 1] has directed it to be expanded to include combat support and combat service support soldiers.

#### IV. BRITISH REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

In Chapter 3, the New Manning System was described and its component parts were identified. In this chapter, the authors digress from the NMS and examine similar features within the British regimental system. The intent is not to evaluate that system, but to look at its various parts to see how the regiment is integrated into an effective fighting force.

##### A. NEW SOLDIERS

Following recruitment, the new combat arms soldier receives his basic and advanced individual training at a division depot, which is staffed by personnel from all of the regiments found in the division. Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 6] states that due to low density of many specialized support personnel, they attend basic training at division depots, and their advanced training is conducted at locations outside the depot, such as branch locations or schools. From the very beginning new recruits wear the uniform of their particular regiment. This unit identification is the first official step in the integration of the new recruit into the regimental culture and initiates the development of a cohesive bond between the new soldier and his regiment. Although it can obviously extend beyond regimental boundaries, this system fosters the soldier's primary loyalty to his regiment. Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 11] believe that this "loyalty to the regiment" is established early in the soldier's life and is maintained and reinforced throughout his career.

## B. ORGANIZATION

Under the current concept, the British regimental system is directed primarily at the combat arms soldiers. Since the regiment is not a tactical entity, its composition may vary considerably, but it normally ranges from one to five battalions. According to the Manning System Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 11], no hard and fast rules govern the system, and, in the case of the artillery, the regiment consists of the entire branch. Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 7] states that reserve forces play an important part in the system, and sister battalions may be found both as active duty and reserve units, with the number of battalions in one regiment being subject to the needs of the Army.

Even though regimental battalions are of the same branch, they are often organized and equipped for different missions. For instance, one of the regiment's infantry battalions might be organized as an airmobile battalion stationed in England, while another one of its infantry battalions is a mechanized unit stationed in West Germany. The battalions may be assigned to the same brigade or division, but typically they are not. Individual battalions are normally found scattered throughout the Army wherever they are required.

## C. ROTATION

To prevent battalions from going "stale," they are rotated approximately every three to four years. This rotation often includes the reconfiguration from one mission to another, e.g., airmobile to mechanized. Battalions rotating to long-term overseas areas are normally warned two years in advance. This warning period allows the involved units to establish liaison, coordinate the exchange of equipment, and learn the basic requirements of their new job. According to

Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 7], the newly arriving battalion has had an opportunity to prepare itself for its new role, and, by skillful use of advance parties, is considered capable of accepting tactical missions almost immediately after arrival at its new duty station. Watson [Ref. 19: p. 56] believes that even though there may be a diminished operational capability during the changeover, the cohesiveness and esprit alive within the regiment tends to offset the lack of mission experience.

#### D. UNIFORMS

To foster identification and enhance cohesion among their members, combat arms regiments are identified by distinctive badges, insignia, headgear and/or special items of apparel. Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 9] point out that regimental identification may involve only minor items of uniform apparel or may be very distinctive in nature, as seen in the Scottish regiment's kilt. Within a regiment, all of its permanently assigned combat arms soldiers wear the regiment's distinctive accoutrements and/or uniform apparel. This ability to identify with a specific regiment is a positive factor in the formation of a cohesive bond between regimental members. Regimental personnel continue to wear regimental identification devices even when assigned to duties outside the regiment.

Since combat support units do not operate under the formal regimental system, their personnel are individually rotated on a 3-year basis to wherever their skills are required. Even though their soldiers do not enjoy the same benefits of the relatively stable regimental assignment process, combat support branches attempt to develop a sense of cohesion through the wear of distinctive badges and headgear. Combat support soldiers continue to wear these items



regardless of their unit of assignment. For example, a combat support soldier might wear a black beret indicating his branch, even though he is serving with an infantry regiment whose members wear blue berets. The British think this use of accoutrements and uniform apparel helps to foster cohesion and a sense of unity among their combat support soldiers. Although given wide latitude in uniform wear, Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 9] indicate that dress regulations are not completely without guidance, and all changes must be approved at the Department of the Army level.

#### E. REPLACEMENTS

One of the major differences between the regimental units and those not under the system is the method of personnel replacement. Under the regimental system, entire units, normally battalions, are replaced at one time. This unit replacement is the glue that allows the cohesiveness, generated from prolonged contact with unit members, to bind the unit into an effective fighting force. Prior to unit rotation, some members may elect to transfer out, while others may be reclassified for various reasons, resulting in some fragmentation of the unit's soldiers. These losses are normally small and fail to adversely impact on the battalion's sense of cohesion and esprit.

Stanhope [Ref. 20: p. 32] states that in contrast to the regiment's unit replacement system, combat support units use a "trickle posting" method, which equates to the American individual replacement system. Cheaper to operate and easier to manage, the "trickle posting" system fails to provide the cohesion and esprit found in the regimental system. Low density requirements and lack of career development and promotion opportunities have been factors which preclude the combat support units from adopting unit replacement.

Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 24] say that regiments may employ unit rotation during limited war situations, provided a home rotation base is maintained at an adequate level. During periods of limited war, the length of overseas tours have usually been shortened to about one year. During general war, when the majority of combat arms units are committed overseas, the British practice has been to leave units in place within a theatre of operation and to reinforce them with individual replacements or sub-unit drafts.

#### F. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

According to Watson [Ref. 19: p. 53], career management for the regiment's soldiers is handled by the battalion commander, along with one or two central record offices which cover a number of infantry divisions. The battalion commander is assisted in this area by his company commanders and the regimental sergeant major (E9). The normal sequence for a new enlisted soldier is to spend his first three years in the same platoon learning his job. Further training is dictated by the unit's needs and job requirements.

Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 7] states that soldiers' promotions through the grade of E4 are determined by battalion-level promotion boards consisting of unit commanders, the sergeant major, and other senior personnel. According to Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 31], promotions in the senior ranks are conducted by regimental boards with more emphasis being placed on merit and potential than straight seniority. The value of this board is the fact that some, if not all, of the board members know the candidate personally, which acts as a quality control check on the selection process.

Generally, the more senior the noncommissioned officer is, the less time he will spend with the regiment. External requirements place a manpower drain on the regiment's

assets, and senior people often spend one-third to one-half of their time outside the regiment performing these duties. Even when performing external duties, members maintain affiliation with the regiment through the wearing of regimental accoutrements and/or apparel.

#### G. RETENTION

Bunyan [Ref. 21: p. 90] says that heavy reliance is placed on the motivation of unit pride, membership, and esprit to attract and retain volunteers. The close knit, paternalistic nature of the regiment encourages commanders to take a close interest in their soldiers, thus supporting retention goals. Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 10] think the regiment demands loyalty of its members and it reciprocates by "looking after its own." According to Watson [Ref. 19: p. 54], the British think the key to good retention is job satisfaction, and soldiers can be retained if they feel they are doing a worthwhile job, are appreciated and are a part of a team.

This retention concept parallels Herzberg, Mausner and Synderman's [Ref. 22: p. 113] theory about work motivation which states that certain hygiene factors, such as pay, do not directly motivate soldiers. However, these hygiene factors are important since their dissatisfaction or satisfaction ultimately affects the soldier's attitude and undoubtedly influences his decision to reenlist or not. The importance of a soldier's self-worth is extremely relevant, and a unit's ability to make their people feel they are an integral and essential part of the unit ultimately bonds the soldier to his unit and regiment. Van Creveld's [Ref. 23: p. 163] comment about why men fight closely parallels the reason why the British regimental system is successful in retaining its personnel and meeting its retention goals. He

said that a German soldier, as a rule, did not fight for Nazi ideology. Instead, he fought because he felt himself a part of a well-integrated and well-led team which depended on him.

## B. FAMILIES

Since families are an integral part of the regimental personnel management system. Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 8] says that tremendous effort is expended to insure that dependents are given proper care. David [Ref. 24: p. 5] states that in order to accomplish this task, each battalion has a designated Families Officer, who is responsible for providing assistance to family members during unit rotation. According to Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 8], this commitment to the family is shown by the fact that a large percentage of British families are housed in government-controlled housing. This close relationship of the family to the regiment fosters the idea that "the regiment cares" and is an important factor in the production of the cohesiveness which binds the regiment together.

## I. SUMMARY

Since its inception in 1660, the regimental system has been a part of the the British way of life. New regimental soldiers enter service, are trained by regimental cadre, and often spend much of their entire military career within the same regiment. Regimental loyalty is initiated in the very beginning and is reinforced throughout the soldier's career, often extending into retirement. The regiment cultivates unit cohesion, esprit, and a sense of self-worth through its use of unit replacement, uniform accoutrements, uniform apparel, personnel management practices, and its treatment of the member's family. Through skillful use of the system,

the regiment has been able to recruit and retain the quantity and quality of soldiers that it needs.

Because of mission requirements and the low density of combat support soldiers in most units, they are not part of the regimental system. Recognizing this as a problem and wanting to create as much cohesion as possible, combat support branches have adopted the wear of distinctive uniform insignia and berets. Regardless of unit of assignment, combat support soldiers maintain affiliation with their branches through the wear of these devices. The British recognize the system's limitations, but think that it is a positive element that assists in providing some element of cohesion to their combat support soldiers.

## **V. APPLYING THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS AND WHY IN ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION IT WON'T WORK**

The New Manning System, in spite of its problems, is working quite well for the combat arms, and this is encouraging. However, the New Manning System will not work when applied to the Adjutant General Corps (AGC). This chapter will discuss why the New Manning System, in its present configuration, cannot be applied to the Adjutant General Corps.

### **A. WHY THE UNIT REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WON'T WORK**

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the unit replacement system consists of stabilization and unit replacement. The reasons why these features cannot be applied to the AGC will be discussed below in separate sections.

#### **1. Why Stabilization Won't Work**

In the unit replacement system, stabilization within the unit begins in initial entry training (IET) and continues through the end of a unit's 3-year life cycle. This works well in combat arms branches because the course lengths of IET are the same within each branch. For example, all the specialties in the Infantry have identical course lengths. Therefore, the soldiers attend one station unit training (OSUT) where they are in the same unit at the same installation for the duration of their IET. As discussed in Chapter 3, the unit is then joined by a cadre to form a stabilized unit for the remainder of its life cycle. This allows for cohesion to begin to be developed in these units during the conduct of OSUT.

Stabilization will not work in the Adjutant General Corps for several reasons. First, AGC soldiers may attend basic training (BT) at any installation that conducts it. Therefore, not all personnel who are recruited in the same time period will undergo BT at the same installation. Upon completion of BT, soldiers must then attend advanced individual training (AIT), which is usually conducted at a different installation than their BT. Furthermore, not all AGC AIT is conducted at one location. Depending upon the soldier's specialty, he or she may attend AIT at one of four different installations. Finally, not all AIT course lengths are the same, varying from seven weeks and three days to 12 weeks in length. This does not include the School of Music for bandmen, which is six months in length. Therefore, varying locations for basic training and advanced individual training, coupled with different course lengths, prevent the application of unit stabilization to the Adjutant General Corps.

## 2. Why Unit Replacement Won't Work

Unit replacement means that overseas requirements will be met by employing the entire unit. The major problem involving moving an AGC unit is that of severance of service to supported units. The AGC is a combat service support branch. Its units provide personnel administration and management support to customer units. If an entire unit was reassigned overseas, it would mean that service to customers would stop, and a backlog would be created in personnel actions and maintenance of records. For example, if the 7th AG Company was deployed to Germany, the 7th Infantry Division would be without AGC support until a replacement unit for the 7th AG Company arrived. Because of travel and leave time involved, it would not be unreasonable to expect approximately 45 days to pass before a supporting AG company could begin to service customers in a new location.

But once in that new location, the unit is still not capable of immediately providing full support to its customers. Local regulations and procedures vary in personnel management and administration, and some time is needed to train the personnel in these new ways. Secondly, the historical and institutional knowledge is lost concerning ongoing personnel actions, and the logic and reasoning for actions taken on particular cases would be unknown.

Another problem associated with movement of units is that the AGC lacks common Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). For example, the number of personnel authorized in a personnel service company varies from 20 to 232. In addition to this, missions differ between CONUS and overseas units. In Europe, Military Personnel Office (MILPO) assets have been removed from the AG company and combined with corps and community assets to form Regional Personnel Centers (RPC). This leaves the AG company with primarily an administrative role. In CONUS and Korea, the AG company performs the mission of a MILPO, but it is often supplemented by corps and/or garrison assets. These assets would not be reassigned with the company in the event of unit replacement.

Finally, the vast majority of AGC soldiers are assigned outside of AGC units. According to the Director of the AG School [Ref. 25], the AGC soldier is assigned to every installation and unit in the Army. Administrative Specialists (71L) and Personnel Management Specialists (75B) are found in more than 2,000 TOE and TDA units. According to the Manning System Task Force [Ref. 26], only 4 percent of the AGC soldiers could be stabilized through AGC unit replacement. This percentage increases to only 11.5 percent if all TOE units use unit replacement.



In summation, the severance of support and resultant backlog, the lack of common structure and mission, and the wide dispersal of soldiers prohibit the use of unit replacement in the Adjutant General Corps.

#### **B. WHY THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM WON'T WORK**

The establishment of permanent regiments and their home-bases combine to form the regimental system. A regiment is defined as a grouping of battalions of similar structural configuration and function. To accomplish this grouping, battalions in CONUS are linked, or paired, with another battalion OCONUS. These battalions then form a regiment and facilitate unit replacement. The first problem facing the AGC in this process is that there are very few AG battalions. There are five personnel and administration battalions in the Army. The battalion headquarters are comparable in organization and authorized strength, but the number of personnel service companies (PSC) subordinate to the battalions ranges from one to four. As mentioned previously, the authorized strength of a PSC varies from 20 to 232 personnel.

This lack of common structure is only one problem. Another problem is the imbalance between the number of units located in CONUS as opposed to those located OCONUS. If it were acceptable to link companies instead of battalions in order to form a regiment, this imbalance would prevent it from occurring. There are 28 postal detachments in the Army, and all but two of them are located OCONUS. Similarly, there are 12 PSCs OCONUS, while there are only four in CONUS. This imbalance prohibits unit replacement. Furthermore, forming regiments with all of their units located CONUS would be useless, as soldiers would spend much more time assigned to units outside of their regiments, especially if their regiment is in Korea.

Since the establishment of regiments is prohibited by lack of common organization and structure and CONUS/OCONUS imbalance, it would not make any sense to have a regimental homebase. There is nothing that prevents the Army from declaring an installation a regimental homebase, but there is no need for one without a regiment.

### C. SUMMARY

The New Manning System in its present configuration is not suited for application to the Adjutant General Corps. The inconsistencies in initial entry training lengths and locations, the requirement to sever support and the resultant backlog, the lack of common structure and mission, the wide dispersal of soldiers, and the unit imbalance within the Adjutant General Corps prevent the application of the New Manning System. But all is not lost. The configuration of the New Manning System can be modified in some aspects. The authors will address some modifications which may be of benefit to the soldiers, the Adjutant General Corps, and the United States Army in the next chapter.

## **VI. A CONCEPT THAT CAN WORK IN THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS**

Even though the combat arms version of the NMS cannot be directly applied to the AGC, alternatives exist. In this chapter, the authors present a concept which will integrate many of the desirable features of the NMS into the AGC. The basic purposes of these changes are to create a climate conducive to the development and/or increase of unit esprit and cohesion, with the ultimate goal of increased combat effectiveness.

### **A. REGIMENTAL ANALYSIS**

This analysis is divided into two subsections. The first subsection deals with the definition of a regiment. The second subsection presents guidelines to be used in regimental identification.

#### **1. Regiment Definition**

Conceptually, a regiment could be defined in many different ways. The authors offer the following definitions:

a. Entire branch regiment: An entire branch would be designated as a regiment. This idea is readily adaptable to branches which are numerically small, especially since strong branch affiliation and identification currently exist. Examples of these regiments might be Finance, Judge Advocate General, or Chemical. Further division of functions or groups within regiments would not exist under this definition.

b. Functionally subdivided regiments: A branch would be subdivided into functional groupings, e.g., the AGC

would be subdivided into the administration, band, etc., with these functional groupings being designated as separate regiments. This would consolidate soldiers with similar skills and job experience, and allow them to be identified as a separate entity, and would best apply to numerically larger branches such as the Transportation, Signal, and Adjutant General Corps. An example of this is where a 75B (Personnel Administration Specialist) could identify and form a stronger bond to a Personnel Regiment than to the AGC as a whole. These functionally grouped regiments would serve to establish professional association-type bonds between members, narrow a soldier's circle of professional associates, and facilitate the development of cohesion. These regiments would not be established to supplant the mother branch, but rather to assist it in achieving mission goals.

c. Entire branch regiment with functionally subdivided battalions: This definition calls for the establishment of a single branch regiment with further subdivision of its functional groupings into regimental battalions. This division would serve to strengthen soldier identification to the branch while presenting a climate conducive to the development of strong primary bonds between similarly skilled soldiers serving together in a battalion. An example of this would be the establishment of the entire AGC as a regiment, with one of its functional groupings, like administration, being a battalion. It is envisioned that administrative soldiers would identify more closely to their own battalion than the regiment as a whole. However, even with this subdivision of functional groupings, overall identification and affiliation to the regiment would be strengthened.

d. Geographically subdivided regiments: Branches would be divided into geographical areas which

would, in turn, be designated as regiments. This would encourage soldiers located in the same geographic area, such as the southeastern portion of the states, to identify with one another as being part of the Southeastern AGC Regiment. The authors think a minimum of 500 authorizations should exist in a regiment or battalion for a subdivision to occur. This definition would apply to the numerically larger branches. As before, the intent of this breakdown was not to supplant the basic branch, but to assist it in mission accomplishment and in the building of esprit and cohesion.

## 2. Regiment Guidelines

Now that four definitions of a regiment have been presented, what basic guidelines are pertinent to the establishment of an effective regiment? Currently, the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) is designed to provide a career progression path for an enlisted soldier from the rank of E1 through E9. Because of this, the authors think a regiment should accommodate this policy by allowing for a soldier to be promoted to E9 without being forced to become a member of another regiment or battalion. Initiatives contrary to EPMS policy would be counterproductive and cast doubts on the basic ideas underlying the establishment of regiments.

Since many Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) "cap out" at a rank less than E9, a promotion may force a soldier into a different MOS. For example, when an E7 03C (Physical Activities Specialist) is promoted to E8, his MOS is changed from 03C to 71L (Administrative Specialist). This MOS change provides continued career progression opportunities to the rank of E9. So what is the point to all of this? Since many disruptive situations like this currently exist, the authors think future changes should not add confusing and disruptive policies. Therefore, the

identification of a regiment should take into consideration career progression requirements to minimize the forced transfer of soldiers from one regiment or battalion to another due to promotion.

The numerical size of a regiment should be taken into consideration, as regiments should be small enough to encourage close identification between members and the regiment itself. On the other hand, regiments need to be large enough to allow DA managers flexibility in making assignments. In this regard, subdivisions of groups within the regiment are a viable and worthwhile option.

Finally, regiments should be composed of soldiers with similar or closely related skills, jobs and career progression paths. This will narrow the soldier's professional circle, assist in the establishment of a feeling of "oneness," and encourage the formation of esprit, morale, and cohesion.

## **B. REGIONAL ANALYSIS**

As explained in Chapter 5, homebasing is not considered practical for the AGC soldier. If homebasing is not practical, is there a feasible alternative? Regional basing of AGC soldiers is attainable and appears to be an acceptable alternative. In this system, soldiers would be assigned to designated areas of the United States called regions. Once assigned, every effort would be made to insure that a soldier would serve his CONUS tours in this region. Even during periods of special assignments, such as ROTC or reserve advisor, attempts would be made to station a person in his designated region.

While failing to provide as many benefits as homebasing, regional basing does have its advantages. Often soldiers and their spouses hail from the same geographic part of the

country, and repeated assignments into this area would increase the opportunity for visits to parents and/or relatives. Additionally, regional basing would afford a person an opportunity to spend a large portion of their career in an area suitable to their lifestyle and background. For instance, a person who likes the cold, snow, and skiing might opt for a region that includes the northeast part of the country. This would serve to fulfill the soldier's desires while satisfying the Army's needs.

Regions would serve as a restricting device by permanently assigning AGC personnel to a designated portion of the country. Regardless of any other benefits, the fact that a soldier knows he or she will be located in a relatively restricted region helps to reduce the constant psychological stress of "Where in the entire United States will I go next?" Regional basing has the potential for providing many positive benefits.

Since the idea of regionalization appears to be a valid and positive concept, factors must be established to facilitate in the determination of regions. Considerations to be determined in the breakdown of regions are as follows:

1. Regions must be small enough to allow soldiers to identify with them. Due to mission requirements and the subsequent distribution of personnel, some states have few, if any, AGC authorizations. Although not desired, this may require that some regions be quite large geographically.

2. For assignment reasons, regions must be large enough to insure a sufficient number of authorizations exist within the same MOS. While there is no "magic number," the authors think a minimum figure of 15 percent of CONUS authorizations is required in each region in order for DA to reasonably guarantee repetitive assignments to a region, subject to the needs of the Army.

3. The grade structure of the authorizations should allow for career progression within each region. Due to the limited size of some MOSSs, the authors think that a minimum of 100 authorizations, which closely approximate the percentage of the CONUS rank distribution, should be present in a region.

4. The physical location of installations within a state must be considered. For example, because Kansas installations are located close to the Kansas and Missouri border, Kansas and Missouri should be placed the same region.

5. To assist in effective management of assets, the geographical breakdown of regions for all MOSSs should be identical.

#### C. SUMMARY

In this chapter, definitions of regiments and battalions were discussed, and guidelines concerning the formation of them presented. The concept of regional basing was proposed and explained. While providing less stability than home-basing, regional basing has many positive and worthwhile features which would serve to foster esprit and cohesion within the AGC. Specific recommendations concerning the adoption and implementation of these ideas will be presented in the following chapter.



## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**

The purpose of this thesis was to address whether the principles of the NMS should be applied to the enlisted personnel in the AGC; if so, how; and whether applying these principles meets the needs of the Army, the objectives of the NMS, and the needs and desires of the AGC soldiers. In Chapter 5, the authors discussed why the NMS, in its present configuration, could not effectively be applied to the AGC. In Chapter 6, alternatives to regimental units and regimental housing were presented. This chapter will address specific recommendations on ways to apply these alternatives to the Adjutant General Corps.

### **A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGIMENT AND BATTALION IDENTIFICATION**

Based on the discussion presented in Chapter 6, the authors propose the entire branch of the AGC be identified as a regiment--the Adjutant General Corps Regiment. Since it is a large corps and comprised of many functional groupings, the regiment should be further subdivided into 10 battalions. Battalion identification will conform as closely as possible to the regimental guidelines mentioned in Chapter 6. The 10 battalions are as follows:

1. The Administration Battalion, consisting of soldiers with MOSs 71L (Administrative Specialist), 71C (Stenographer), and 03C (Physical Activities Specialist). Because 03Cs are required by career progression to become 71Ls at the E8 level, they were included in this battalion. While forced to make an MOS change, the soldier will at least remain in the same battalion.

2. The Data Processing Equipment Operations Battalion, consisting of soldiers with the MOSSs 74D (Computer/Machine Operator), 74F (Programmer/Analyst), and 74Z (Data Processing NCO).

3. The Personnel Battalion, consisting of soldiers with the MOSSs 75B (Personnel Administration Specialist), 75C (Personnel Management Specialist), 75D (Personnel Records Specialist), 75E (Personnel Actions Specialist), 75F (Personnel Information Systems Management Specialist), and 75Z (Personnel Senior Sergeant).

4. The Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalion, comprised of soldiers with the MOS 00R (Recruiter/Retention NCO).

5. The Club Management Battalion, consisting of 00J (Club Manager) personnel.

6. The Equal Opportunity Battalion, which is comprised of 00U (Equal Opportunity NCO) personnel.

7. The Band Battalion, comprised of all the soldiers in the Career Management Field (CMF) 97 (Bandsman).

8. The Legal Battalion, consisting of the MOSSs 71D (Legal Clerk) and 71E (Court Reporter).

9. The Chapel Activities Battalion, comprised of 71M (Chapel Activities Specialist) personnel.

10. The Journalism Battalion, which is comprised of MOSSs 71Q (Journalist) and 71R (Broadcast Journalist). The Journalism Battalion presents a unique situation requiring explanation. Although under the proponentcy of the Signal Corps (SC), personnel in these MOSSs wear AGC branch insignia. These journalism personnel follow a career progression path that, upon promotion to E8, requires them to be reclassified into the MOS 84Z (Public Affairs/Audio Visual Chief), a Signal MOS. This change would not be nearly so drastic had it transpired earlier in the soldier's career. Now, after being associated for much of his career

with members of the Journalism Battalion, the soldier is forced to switch to a Signal MOS and a new regiment. Further compounding the problem is the fact that all 842 personnel do not wear the same branch insignia. Some personnel wear AGC brass; others, SC brass. This situation is not very conducive to the development of an atmosphere in which cohesion and esprit can flourish.

Establishment of the above battalions would accomplish several things. It would further define a member's primary group, allow for a more personal identification with similarly skilled individuals, and encourage members' affiliation to their battalion. Another benefit would be the integration of the battalions to the regiment through the linking process afforded by the chain of command, as explained in Chapter 2.

Adoption of the proposed 10 battalions is not totally void of concerns. First, all of the enlisted soldiers that work with the Judge Advocate General and Chaplain Corps are managed by the AGC, while the officers are managed by their respective branches. So where does a soldier's primary allegiance belong; with the Legal Battalion, or with the soldier's primary work cell which includes officers from another branch or regiment? It is questionable that this dual regiment arrangement would provide the required climate conducive to the development of the desired degree of cohesion and branch affiliation. An additional concern is that of the Journalism personnel, which was addressed above.

As in most situations, every desirable feature of a proposal cannot always be implemented. This is the case in the Club Management, Equal Opportunity, and Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalions. Since all authorized positions in these battalions are in the rank of E5 and up, all of their soldiers must be recruited from other MOSs. On a one-time basis, these soldiers would be required to change

battalions, and possibly regiments, but once into the new MOS and regiment, could remain there through promotion to E9.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGIONAL IDENTIFICATION**

Because of the size of the Adjutant General Corps Regiment and some of its battalions, the authors felt that cohesion and a narrowing of the professional circle would be enhanced by further dividing five of the battalions into regions. Using the guidelines discussed in Chapter 6, it is recommended that the Continental United States be divided into the following regions:

1. West: which includes the 10 states of Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, Nevada and California.

2. South Central: which includes the 5 states of New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas.

3. North Central: which includes the 14 states of North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Tennessee and Ohio.

4. Northeast: which includes the 13 states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

5. Southeast: which includes the 6 states of North and South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida.

This regional breakdown consists of areas which are quite large, yet, to insure that a soldier could be repetitively assigned to a region, this was a necessity. The map shown at Figure 7.1 outlines the five regions. Because




Figure 7.1 CONUS Regions.

these areas are so large, the benefits of homebasing will not always be available to the AGC soldier. However, consistent with the needs of the Army, every effort should be made to insure that a soldier is repetitively reassigned to his region, and to a desired installation when possible. Repetitive reassignments to a region will not be artificial. They will be made in order to meet the requirements of the Army first and the desires of the soldier second.

Dividing all of the battalions into regions would cause artificial assignments, prevent the guarantee of repetitive reassignments, and prevent the Army from meeting its needs. Because of this, numerically small battalions were not divided into regions. The authors felt that if a battalion had less than 500 CCNUS authorizations, or if one of its regions had less than 100 authorizations, it qualified as a numerically small battalion and should not be divided into regions. Therefore, it is recommended that the following battalions be divided into regions:

1. The Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalion.
2. The Administration Battalion.
3. The Legal Battalion.
4. The Chapel Activities Battalion.
5. The Personnel Battalion.

A detailed analysis of the regional breakdowns of all battalions is located at Appendix A.

### C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BAND ROTATION

One of the four areas of the NMS deals with unit replacement. As discussed in Chapter 5, the AGC's mission, unit configurations and geographic dispersion do not lend the AGC to the effective use of unit replacement. However, there are some situations where this concept can be selectively employed. According to the School of Music, there

are three major Army command bands operating under one TOE, 16 division bands under another TOE, and 26 other bands operating under another TOE or TDA. Due to the nature of their mission, structural similarities, and geographic dispersion, the unit rotation of bands is generally considered feasible. In fact, the authors think the band may well be the best unit in the Army for unit rotation, as they live together, work together, have a common interest (music). Only four bands--the U.S. Army Field Band, located at Fort Meade, MD; the Army Band and the Old Guard Band, located at Fort Meyer, Virginia; and the Academy Band at West Point, NY--are considered outside of the acceptable parameters of unit replacement and should not be considered in any rotation system.

Therefore, the authors propose that the concept of unit replacement (or rotation) be applied to the bands. It is further recommended that the proponent for the bands develop the specifics for band rotation, to include homebasing, and that it be implemented at the earliest possible date.

#### D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Based on discussion in this thesis, or on the lack of expertise and data available to the authors, it is recommended that several areas be the subjects of further study.

1. Determine the feasibility of assigning the Legal Battalion (MOS 71D and 71E) to the Judge Advocate General Corps for proponentcy. Since the enlisted personnel perform their duties in a work cell with officers from another branch and regiment, it is doubtful that these enlisted personnel will develop a cohesive attitude towards others in the AGC Regiment. This study should include what branch insignia or other accoutrements will be worn.

2. Determine the feasibility of assigning the Chapel Activities Battalion (MOS 71M) to the Chaplain Corps for propcnency. The same arguments apply to this situation as in the Legal Battalion above. Chapel Activities Specialists work with Chaplains, not with other AGC personnel. This study should also include the determination of which branch insignia and uniform accoutrements will be worn.

3. Determine the feasibility of having Journalism personnel wear Signal Corps branch insignia. Since these personnel are under the propcnency of the Signal Corps, a study should be made to determine which branch insignia should be worn. Cohesion could be improved if all personnel in MCS 84Z wear the same branch insignia. Presently, personnel in the Journalism Battalion wear AGC brass and are managed by the Signal Corps, so it is difficult to tell which branch they belong to.

4. Develop the specifics for band rotation as discussed in the previous section of this chapter.

5. Determine the feasibility of the establishment of regimental messes and museums and the wear of distinctive uniform apparel and accoutrements. Due to the limited expertise and resources of the authors, these topics were not addressed in this thesis. However, they are an important aid to creating an atmosphere conducive to the increase of cohesion and esprit and should be studied immediately.

## E. CONCLUSION

The authors know that implementation of these recommendations will not be an easy accomplishment, and that these recommendations will not provide the AGC soldiers all of the benefits which are provided to the combat arms soldier by the New Manning System. However, some benefits can be



realized by these proposed actions, and, therefore, implementation is warranted.

Establishing the entire branch as a regiment will continue to draw upon the presence of branch pride and traditions. Establishing regimental messes and museums and the wear of distinctive uniform apparel and accoutrements may give the AGC soldier the same benefits that they give the combat arms soldier and should be studied seriously.

Establishing battalions and regions will narrow the professional circle of soldiers, giving them a greater sense of belonging and increase cohesion among peers. Battalions would still be linked to the regiment, much like a platoon is linked to a company.

Reassigning the Legal and Chapel Activities Battalions and changing the insignia of the Journalism Battalion is crucial towards creating an atmosphere conducive to the development of cohesion in these personnel. In the present configuration of the AGC, these personnel are basically "adopted" and have no similarities with other MOSs in the Corps.

Implementing band rotation should provide even more benefits than unit replacement does, since it is envisioned that bands would not be disestablished at the end of three years like the COHORT unit.

There is only one reason to implement these recommendations: to increase the esprit, cohesion, and combat effectiveness of the soldiers. If this cannot be accomplished, then implementation is senseless. The authors believe that implementing these recommendations will accomplish this and, at the same time, enhance the Adjutant General Corps and the United States Army.

**APPENDIX A**  
**REGIONAL BREAKDOWNS OF BATTALIONS**

This appendix presents data, obtained from information provided by the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) data base, which was used to determine which battalions should be subdivided into regions. Authorizations with an effective date of 1 January 1987 were selected to coincide with ongoing Department of the Army projects. A caveat concerning the authorizations: a position authorized at one station, with an assignment for duty at a second station, is shown as an authorization at the first station. Example: A OOR is authorized at Fort Sheridan, IL, with a duty station at Topeka, KS. Therefore, the data shows an authorization for Fort Sheridan, not for Topeka.

This appendix contains a battalion analysis, tables, and maps detailing the authorizations and geographic breakdown of each battalion in the Adjutant General Corps Regiment. The battalion analysis presents a summary of the data portrayed by the regional breakdown and highlights areas of concern. Also included is a recommendation on whether or not the battalions should be divided into regions. Separate tables exist for each battalion and are further divided into the following parts:

a. CONUS Authorizations. This shows the number of authorizations by grade in each region, the total authorizations in each region, the CONUS authorizations by grade, and the total authorizations.

b. Percentage of CONUS Authorizations Per Region. This shows the percentage of the total CONUS authorizations that is in each region and is broken down by grade. For

example, this part of Table I shows that 22.9 percent of the E7 00J authorizations in CONUS are located in the West Region.

c. Percentage of Authorizations by Grade Within Each Region. This shows what percentage of a region's total authorizations are in a specific grade. For example, this part of Table I shows that 59.5 percent of the 00J authorizations in the West Region are in the grade of E7.

d. Region Authorizations. This shows the number of authorizations by grade in each state (and Washington, D.C.), the total authorizations in each state, the region's authorizations by grade, and the region's total authorizations.

Maps identify the regions, their percentage of CONUS authorizations, and the states having less than 1 percent of the total CONUS authorizations for each specialty. (These states were considered to have a negligible impact on the determination of the regions.)

**TABLE I**  
**CLUB MANAGEMENT BATTALION**

1. This battalion consists of soldiers with MOS 00J (Club Manager).
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from a low of 11.7 percent (South Central) to a high of 35.1 percent (Northeast). Based on these percentages, four of the five regions meet the 15 percent guideline.
3. The battalion fails to meet the guideline of at least 500 CONUS authorizations, having only 239. Furthermore, all regions have less than 100 authorizations, with the South Central Region having only 28. Due to the numerically small amount of authorizations, the regional distributions are heavily skewed, with the Northeast Region having three times the authorizations as the South Central.
4. Further compounding the problem is the fact that the distribution by grade is also highly disproportional, with nearly 70 percent of the E8 authorizations being in only two regions (Northeast and Southeast). This would prevent career progression within the other regions.
5. Based on these data, recommend that this battalion not be further subdivided into regions.

# Club Management Battalion

## CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST				12	25	2	3	42
SOUTH CENTRAL				7	13	6	2	28
SOUTHEAST				12	15	11	2	40
NORTHEAST			2	34	32	14	2	84
NORTH CENTRAL			-	<u>17</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>45</u>
CONUS TCIAL			2	82	109	36	10	239

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST				14.6	22.9	5.6	30.0	17.6
SOUTH CENTRAL				8.5	11.9	16.7	20.0	11.7
SOUTHEAST				14.6	13.8	30.6	20.0	16.7
NORTHEAST			100.0	41.5	29.4	38.9	20.0	35.1
NORTH CENTRAL				20.7	22.0	8.3	10.0	18.8

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST				28.6	59.5	4.8	7.1
SOUTH CENTRAL				25.0	46.4	21.4	7.1
SOUTHEAST				30.0	37.5	27.5	5.0
NORTHEAST			2.4	40.5	38.1	16.7	2.4
NORTH CENTRAL				37.8	53.3	6.7	2.2
CONUS			0.8	34.3	45.6	15.1	4.2

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA				1	5	1		7
CALIFORNIA				6	5	1	1	13
COLORADO				1	7		1	9
UTAH				2	1			3
WASHINGTON				<u>2</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTAL				12	25	2	3	42

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARKANSAS					1			1
LOUISIANA				2	2	1		5
NEW MEXICO				2				2
OKLAHOMA					4	1	1	6
TEXAS				<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL				7	13	6	2	28

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS


<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA				3	5	1		9
GEORGIA				3	9	7	1	20
N. CAROLINA				4	1			5
S. CAROLINA				<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL				12	15	11	2	40

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MARYLAND				10	4	1		15
MASSACHUSETTS				2	2			4
NEW JERSEY				4	2			6
NEW YORK				2	4			6
PENNSYLVANIA				5	3			8
VIRGINIA			2	9	14	3		28
WASHINGTON, DC			-	-2	-3	10	2	17
TOTAL			2	34	32	14	2	84

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS				4	1			5
INDIANA				2	5			7
KANSAS					8			8
KENTUCKY				5	4	2	1	12
MICHIGAN				5				5
MISSOURI					6	1		7
WISCONSIN				-1	-	-	-	-1
TOTAL				17	24	3	1	45



NO AUTHORIZATIONS

LESS THAN 1% OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

Figure A.1 Club Management Battalion Regions.



**TABLE II**  
**RECRUITMENT AND REENLISTMENT BATTALION**

1. This battalion consists of MOS 00R (Recruiter/Retention NCO) personnel.
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from 10.3 percent (South Central) to 37.3 percent (North Central). Two of the five regions do not meet the guideline of having 15 percent of the CONUS authorizations. The North Central Region has a high number of authorizations due to the presence of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command at Fort Sheridan, IL, with 405 authorizations.
3. The Southeast and South Central Regions, both with less than 15 percent of the CONUS authorizations may cause problems with career progression from grade E6 to E7.
4. As mentioned previously, recruiters frequently are authorized at one location, but are assigned for duty at another location. Because of this, it is unknown exactly where all actual duty stations are located.
5. In spite of these possible problems, it is recommended this battalion, primarily because of its large size, be subdivided into the regions indicated.

# Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalion

## CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST			2	189	366	98	12	667
SOUTH CENTRAL				146	214	75	12	447
SOUTHEAST				227	270	91	15	603
NORTHEAST			3	256	574	139	23	995
NORTH CENTRAL			<u>3</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>998</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>1614</u>
CONUS TOTAL			8	1202	2422	612	82	4326

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST			25.0	15.7	15.1	16.0	14.6	15.4
SOUTH CENTRAL				12.1	8.8	12.3	14.6	10.3
SOUTHEAST				18.9	11.1	14.9	18.3	13.9
NORTHEAST			37.5	21.3	23.7	22.7	28.0	23.0
NORTH CENTRAL			37.5	31.9	41.2	34.2	24.4	37.3

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST			0.3	28.3	54.9	14.7	1.8
SOUTH CENTRAL				32.7	47.9	16.8	2.7
SOUTHEAST				37.6	44.8	15.1	2.5
NORTHEAST			0.3	25.7	57.7	14.0	2.3
NORTH CENTRAL			0.2	23.8	61.8	12.9	1.2
CONUS			0.2	27.8	56.0	14.1	1.9

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA				17	27	11	2	57
CALIFORNIA			2	92	200	46	6	346
COLORADO				26	42	11	1	80
OREGON				16	23	7	1	47
UTAH				9	34	11	1	55
WASHINGTON			-	<u>29</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>82</u>
TOTAL			2	189	366	98	12	667

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARKANSAS				19	28	9	1	57
LOUISIANA				15	25	7	1	48
NEW MEXICO				18	20	8	1	47
OKLAHOMA				19	33	15	2	69
TEXAS				<u>75</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>226</u>
TOTAL				146	214	75	12	447

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS


<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA				23	37	10	1	71
FLORIDA				44	64	16	2	126
GEORGIA				37	50	16	5	108
MISSISSIPPI				14	34	9	1	58
N. CAROLINA				79	53	32	4	168
S. CAROLINA				<u>30</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>72</u>
TOTAL				227	270	91	15	603

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CONNECTICUT				12	29	9	1	51
MARYLAND				45	75	19	2	141
MASSACHUSETTS				20	61	12	1	94
NEW HAMPSHIRE				18	21	7	1	47
NEW JERSEY				18	42	8	2	70
NEW YORK			2	53	141	30	3	229
PENNSYLVANIA			1	56	149	30	3	239
VIRGINIA				28	38	18	8	92
WASHINGTON, DC				2	2	1	1	6
WEST VIRGINIA			-	<u>4</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTAL			3	256	574	139	23	995

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS				25	382	67	3	477
INDIANA				26	75	12	2	115
IOWA				11	33	8	1	53
KANSAS				4	2	1		7
KENTUCKY			2	62	51	18	2	135
MICHIGAN			1	60	83	19	2	165
MINNESOTA				12	59	10	1	82
MISSOURI				46	97	17	3	163
NEBRASKA				22	40	13	1	76
OHIO				63	100	24	3	190
TENNESSEE				28	31	10	1	70
WISCONSIN			-	<u>25</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>81</u>
TOTAL			3	384	998	209	20	1614



NO AUTHORIZATIONS

LESS THAN 1% OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

Figure A.2 Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalion Regions.

**TABLE III**  
**EQUAL OPPORTUNITY BATTALION**

1. This battalion is comprised of MOS 00U (Equal Opportunity NCO) personnel.

2. Total CONUS authorizations range from 15.1 percent (West) to 26.3 percent (Southeast). All of the regions exceed the 15 percent guideline.

3. The battalion fails to meet the guidelines of a least 500 CONUS authorizations, having only 285. Additionally, all regions have less than 100 authorizations.

4. Although evenly distributed in total authorizations, some grade distributions may cause problems in career progression. The West (E7, E8, and E9), South Central (E6), and North Central (E9) have potential bottlenecks which would require transfer to another region in order to progress up the hierarchical ladder.

5. Based on the above data, it is recommended this battalion should not be subdivided into regions.

# Equal Opportunity Battalion

## CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST			7	17	17	2		43
SOUTH CENTRAL			4	12	23	5	1	45
SOUTHEAST			4	23	40	7	1	75
NORTHEAST			5	24	33	3	2	67
NORTH CENTRAL			<u>4</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>55</u>
CONUS TOTAL			24	93	142	22	4	285

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST			29.2	18.3	12.0	9.1		15.1
SOUTH CENTRAL			16.7	12.9	16.2	22.7	25.0	15.8
SOUTHEAST			16.7	24.7	28.2	31.8	25.0	26.3
NORTHEAST			20.8	25.8	23.2	13.6	50.0	23.5
NORTH CENTRAL			16.7	18.3	20.4	22.7		19.3

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST			16.3	39.5	39.5	4.7	
SOUTH CENTRAL			8.9	26.7	51.1	11.1	2.2
SOUTHEAST			5.3	30.7	53.3	9.3	1.3
NORTHEAST			7.5	35.8	49.3	4.5	3.0
NORTH CENTRAL			7.3	30.9	52.7	9.1	
CONUS			8.4	32.6	49.8	7.7	1.4

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA			1	4	3			8
CALIFORNIA			3	7	7	1		18
COLORADO			1	1	3			5
UTAH				1				1
WASHINGTON			2	4	4	1		11
TOTAL			7	17	17	2		43

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
LOUISIANA					1	1		2
NEW MEXICO				1	1			2
OKLAHOMA				3	7			10
TEXAS			4	8	14	4	1	31
TOTAL			4	12	23	5	1	45

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA				1	3			4
FLORIDA					8	2		10
GEORGIA				7	8	2	1	18
N. CAROLINA			4	12	19	3		38
S. CAROLINA			-	3	2	-	-	5
TOTAL			4	23	40	7	1	75




# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MARYLAND				2	10			12
MASSACHUSETTS				1	2			3
NEW JERSEY				7	4			11
NEW YORK				1	2			3
PENNSYLVANIA				1				1
VIRGINIA			5	10	12	3	2	32
WASHINGTON, DC			-	-2	-3	-	-	-5
TOTAL			5	24	33	3	2	67

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS					5	1		6
INDIANA				3	3			6
KANSAS			1	1	3	1		6
KENTUCKY			2	9	12	2		25
MICHIGAN					1			1
MISSOURI			1	-4	-5	1		11
TOTAL			4	17	29	5		55



NO AUTHORIZATIONS

LESS THAN 1% OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

Figure A.3 Equal Opportunity Battalion Regions.

**TABLE IV**  
**ADMINISTRATION BATTALION**

1. This battalion consists of personnel with MCSS 71L (Administrative Specialist), 71C (Stenographer), and 03C (Physical Activities Specialist).
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from a low of 14.8 percent (North Central) to a high of 28.0 percent (Northeast). Based on these total percentage, four of the five regions met the guidelines of 15 percent of CONUS authorizations in each region. Only the North Central Region failed to meet this guideline, but that is only because the percentages were not rounded off to the nearest whole number. Close examination of this region indicates sufficient authorizations to allow career progression are present.
3. The West and South Central Regions present a problem in the grades of E6 and E7. Due to career progression and the shortages of authorizations in these grades, soldiers may have to be assigned outside of the region.
4. The primary reasons for the high percentage of E5 through E9 authorizations in the Northeast Region are the presence of the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) and the Pentagon. Due to an administration training center at Fort Jackson, SC, the Southeast Region has a high percentage of E6 and E7 personnel. Despite these skewed authorizations, career progression should be attainable within the regions.
5. It is recommended this battalion be subdivided into the regions indicated.

# Administration Battalion

## CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	298	802	411	227	115	70	17	1940
SOUTH CENTRAL	317	840	376	156	106	84	21	1900
SOUTHEAST	494	1121	591	522	353	100	26	3207
NORTHEAST	378	818	946	540	521	200	46	3449
NORTH CENTRAL	<u>260</u>	<u>574</u>	<u>395</u>	<u>312</u>	<u>191</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1827</u>
CONUS TOTAL	1747	4155	2719	1757	1286	530	129	12,323

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	17.1	19.3	15.1	12.9	8.9	13.2	13.2	15.7
SOUTH CENTRAL	18.1	20.2	13.8	8.9	8.2	15.8	16.3	15.4
SOUTHEAST	28.3	27.0	21.7	29.7	27.4	18.9	20.2	26.0
NORTHEAST	21.6	19.7	34.8	30.7	40.5	37.7	35.7	28.0
NORTH CENTRAL	14.9	13.8	14.5	17.8	14.9	14.3	14.7	14.8

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST	15.4	41.3	21.2	11.7	5.9	3.6	0.9
SOUTH CENTRAL	16.7	44.2	19.8	8.2	5.6	4.4	1.1
SOUTHEAST	15.4	35.0	18.4	16.3	11.0	3.1	0.8
NORTHEAST	11.0	23.7	27.4	15.7	15.1	5.8	1.3
NORTH CENTRAL	14.2	31.4	21.6	17.1	10.5	4.2	1.0
CONUS	14.2	33.7	22.1	14.3	10.4	4.3	1.0

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA	52	86	79	34	20	14	3	288
CALIFCENIA	106	250	159	82	57	34	5	693
COLORADO	77	185	67	34	15	9	2	389
IDAHO			1		1			2
MONTANA			1		1			2
OREGON			2		1	1		4
UTAH		16	14	2	1	2		35
WASHINGTON	<u>63</u>	<u>265</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>527</u>
TOTAL	298	802	411	227	115	70	17	1940

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARKANSAS		1	4	2	2			9
LOUISIANA	33	115	44	11	15	6	1	225
NEW MEXICO	5	18	22	15	4	9	1	74
CKLAHCMA	68	123	60	19	6	4	2	282
TEXAS	<u>211</u>	<u>583</u>	<u>246</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>1310</u>
TOTAL	317	840	376	156	106	84	21	1900

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA	48	85	69	46	27	7	1	283
FLORIDA	2	18	62	17	10	8		117
GEORGIA	155	300	167	92	64	44	15	837
MISSISSIPPI			2	1	1	1		5
N. CARCLINA	208	649	199	200	84	21	9	1370
S. CAROLINA	<u>81</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>166</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>595</u>
TOTAL	494	1121	591	522	353	100	26	3207

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

STATE	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CONNECTICUT			3		1	1		5
DELAWARE		1			1	1		3
MAINE			3		2			5
MARYLAND	59	206	161	86	64	40	9	625
MASSACHUSETTS	32	82	46	34	20	10	1	225
NEW HAMPSHIRE			1		1			2
NEW JERSEY	80	105	120	87	35	29	4	460
NEW YORK	10	24	43	16	19	8	3	123
PENNSYLVANIA		9	26	9	9	7	1	61
VIRGINIA	176	349	484	251	329	81	24	1694
WASHINGTON, DC	21	42	57	57	40	22	4	243
WEST VIRGINIA	---	---	<u>2</u>	---	---	<u>1</u>	---	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	378	818	946	540	521	200	46	3449

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

STATE	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS	13	19	45	28	28	16	2	151
INDIANA	24	26	31	47	53	9	2	192
IOWA			4	2	1	1		8
KANSAS	71	166	56	101	43	19	5	461
KENTUCKY	109	292	105	105	35	17	10	673
MICHIGAN		4	16	1	3	1		25
MINNESOTA			7					7
MISSOURI	43	67	90	25	21	6		252
NEBRASKA			3	1		1		5
N. DAKOTA			2		2			4
OHIO			15	1	2	2		20
S. DAKOTA			1					1
TENNESSEE			16	1	3			20
WISCONSIN	---	---	<u>4</u>	---	---	<u>4</u>	---	<u>8</u>
TOTAL	260	574	395	312	191	76	19	1827




Figure A.4 Administration Battalion Regions.

**TABLE V**  
**LEGAL BATTALION**

1. This battalion consists of MOS 71D (Legal Clerk) and 71E (Court Reporter) personnel.

2. Total CCNUS authorizations range from a low of 13.2 percent in the Northeast to a high of 24.5 percent in the Southeast. Based on these percentages, four regions exceed the 15 percent of CONUS guideline.

3. There is a good distribution of authorizations in all grades and regions, except for the Northeast. Since MOS 71D is primarily a unit-level MOS, and since there are few units in the Northeast, lower rank distribution is skewed. Because of this, the majority of the personnel in the grade of E4 would be required to leave the Northeast upon promotion to E5. This may not be too detrimental since it occurs early in the soldier's career.

4. It is recommended this battalion be subdivided into the regions indicated.



# Legal Battalion

## CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	13	28	133	31	20	6	4	235
SOUTH CENTRAL	12	28	152	25	17	5	6	245
SOUTHEAST	13	36	152	42	22	5	3	273
NORTHEAST	1	36	48	32	21	6	3	147
NORTH CENTRAL	<u>14</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>215</u>
CONUS TOTAL	53	156	589	166	107	26	18	1115

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	24.5	17.9	22.6	18.7	18.7	23.1	22.2	21.1
SOUTH CENTRAL	22.6	17.9	25.8	15.1	15.9	19.2	33.3	22.0
SOUTHEAST	24.5	23.1	25.8	25.3	20.6	19.2	16.7	24.5
NORTHEAST	1.9	23.1	8.1	19.3	19.6	23.1	16.7	13.2
NORTH CENTRAL	26.4	17.9	17.7	21.7	25.2	15.4	11.1	19.3

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST	5.5	11.9	56.6	13.2	8.5	2.6	1.7
SOUTH CENTRAL	4.9	11.4	62.0	10.2	6.9	2.0	2.4
SOUTHEAST	4.8	13.2	55.7	15.4	8.1	1.8	1.1
NORTHEAST	0.7	24.5	32.7	21.8	14.3	4.1	2.0
NORTH CENTRAL	6.5	13.0	48.4	16.7	12.6	1.9	0.9
CONUS	4.8	14.0	52.8	14.9	9.6	2.3	1.6

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA	1	3	8	4	2			18
CALIFCENIA	3	13	43	12	8	2	1	82
COLORADO	6	9	41	10	6	2	1	75
WASHINGTON	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>60</u>
TOTAL	13	28	133	31	20	6	4	235

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
LOUISIANA	5	3	30	3	5	1		47
NEW MEXICCC		1	1	1	1			4
OKLAHOMA		7	20	5	2	1	1	36
TEXAS	<u>7</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>158</u>
TOTAL	12	28	152	25	17	5	6	245

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS


<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA	1	4	8	4	1	1		19
FLORIDA			2					2
GEORGIA	8	13	65	19	9	2	2	118
N. CAROLINA	4	15	74	13	12	1	1	120
S. CAROLINA	<u>—</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL	13	36	152	42	22	5	3	273

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MARYLAND		7	8	3	3	1	1	23
MASSACHUSETTS			6	1	2			9
NEW JERSEY		14	10	8	1		1	34
NEW YORK			3		1	1		5
PENNSYLVANIA		1		1	1			3
VIRGINIA	1	12	18	15	12	3	1	62
WASHINGTON, DC	-	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	-	<u>11</u>
TOTAL	1	36	48	32	21	6	3	147

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS		1	3	2	2			8
INDIANA		1	1	8	7	1		18
KANSAS	9	10	40	7	10	2		78
KENTUCKY	5	13	52	15	7	1	1	94
MISSOURI		3	7	4	1		1	16
OHIO	-	-	<u>1</u>	-	-	-	-	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	14	28	104	36	27	4	2	215



NO AUTHORIZATIONS

LESS THAN 1% OF COMUS AUTHORIZATIONS

Figure A.5 Legal Battalion Regions.

**TABLE VI**  
**CHAPEL ACTIVITIES BATTALION**

1. This battalion is comprised of 71M (Chapel Activities Specialist) personnel.
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from 17.8 percent (North Central) to 23.1 percent (Southeast). Based on these percentages, all regions exceed the 15 percent guideline.
3. Overall distribution of authorizations are good; however, E7 to E9 authorizations are skewed due to the presence of the Chapel School at Fort Monmouth, N.J. Career progression within a region above the grade of E7 will be hampered by this.
4. Even though this area of concern exists, regionalization should benefit soldiers in the grade E3 through E6. Therefore, this battalion should be subdivided into the regions indicated.

# Chapel Activities Battalion

## CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	20	101	32	10	6	4	1	174
SOUTH CENTRAL	12	112	38	16	5	2	5	190
SOUTHEAST	29	117	40	25	5	4	3	223
NORTHEAST	21	83	36	24	27	10	5	206
NORTH CENTRAL	<u>21</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>172</u>
CONUS	103	498	186	92	48	23	15	965

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	19.4	20.3	17.2	10.9	12.5	17.4	6.7	18.0
SOUTH CENTRAL	11.7	22.5	20.4	17.4	10.4	8.7	33.3	19.7
SOUTHEAST	28.2	23.5	21.5	27.2	10.4	17.4	20.0	23.1
NORTHEAST	20.4	16.7	19.4	26.1	56.3	43.5	33.3	21.3
NORTH CENTRAL	20.4	17.1	21.5	18.5	10.4	13.0	6.7	17.8

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST	11.5	58.0	18.4	5.7	3.4	2.3	0.6
SOUTH CENTRAL	6.3	58.9	20.0	8.4	2.6	1.1	2.6
SOUTHEAST	13.0	52.5	17.9	11.2	2.2	1.8	1.3
NORTHEAST	10.2	40.3	17.5	11.7	13.1	4.9	2.4
NORTH CENTRAL	12.2	49.4	23.3	9.9	2.9	1.7	0.6
CONUS	10.7	51.6	19.3	9.5	5.0	2.4	1.6

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA	2	5	5	1	1			14
CALIFCFNIA	9	28	10	3	2	1	1	54
COLORADO	5	28	7	3	2	1		46
UTAH		1	1					58
WASHINGTON	<u>4</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>58</u>
TOTAL	20	101	32	10	6	4	1	174

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
LOUISIANA	1	20	5	1	1		1	29
NEW MEXICO		2	2					4
CKLAHCMA	5	17	8	4			1	35
TEXAS	<u>6</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>122</u>
TOTAL	12	112	38	16	5	2	5	190

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA	4	9	4	3	1			21
GEORGIA	10	53	17	10	2	2	2	96
N. CAROLINA	11	45	14	10	2	1	1	84
S. CARCIINA	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTAL	29	117	40	25	5	4	3	223

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MARYLAND	4	16	7	1	1	1	1	31
MASSACHUSETTS	3	6	1	5	2	1		13
NEW JERSEY	5	23	7	11	18	8	1	73
NEW YORK	1	3	3		1			8
PENNSYLVANIA		3	3					6
VIRGINIA	7	26	13	8	5		2	61
WASHINGTON, DC	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL	21	83	36	24	27	10	5	206

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS	1	1						2
INDIANA		1	1	1	1			4
KANSAS	2	33	12	4	3	1		55
KENTUCKY	12	37	19	8	1	1	1	79
MICHIGAN		2	1					3
MISSOURI	6	11	6	4		1		28
WISCONSIN	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	21	85	40	17	5	3	1	172






Figure A.6 Chapel Activities Battalion Regions.

**TABLE VII**  
**JOURNALISM BATTALION**

1. This battalion is comprised of MOSS 71Q (Journalist) and 71R (Broadcast Journalist).
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from 12.9 percent in the South Central to 29.3 percent in the Northeast. Based on these percentages, four regions exceed 15 percent of the CONUS total.
3. The battalion fails to meet the standard of 500 total CONUS authorizations, having only 488. Three of the five regions have less than 100 authorizations. Additionally, this battalion has no career progression above E7. If the Signal Corps, which controls MOS 84Z, selects any method different from the AGC for implementing the NMS, then regionalization would be meaningless for personnel in this battalion.
4. There is a poor distribution of all grades. At every grade, at least one region fails to meet the guideline of 15 percent of the CONUS authorizations.
5. It is recommended this battalion not be further subdivided into regions.

# Journalism Battalion

## CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	7	42	14	7	10			80
SOUTH CENTRAL	11	22	14	8	8			63
SOUTHEAST	18	46	16	6	18			104
NORTHEAST	16	45	40	19	22			142
NORTH CENTRAL	<u>7</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>25</u>			<u>99</u>
CONUS TOTAL	59	182	96	68	83			488

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	11.9	23.1	14.6	10.3	12.0			16.4
SOUTH CENTRAL	18.6	12.1	14.6	11.8	9.6			12.9
SOUTHEAST	30.5	25.3	16.7	8.8	21.7			21.3
NORTHEAST	27.1	24.7	41.7	27.9	26.5			29.1
NORTH CENTRAL	11.9	14.8	12.5	41.2	30.1			20.3

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST	8.8	52.5	17.5	8.8	12.5		
SOUTH CENTRAL	17.5	34.9	22.2	12.7	12.7		
SOUTHEAST	17.3	44.2	15.4	5.8	17.3		
NORTHEAST	11.3	31.7	28.2	13.4	15.5		
NORTH CENTRAL	7.1	27.3	12.1	28.3	25.3		
CONUS	12.1	37.3	19.7	13.9	17.0		

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA	1	5	4		5			15
CALIFCFNIA	1	19	5	5	3			23
COLORADO	4	10	1	1	1			17
UTAH		2	1	1				4
WASHINGTON	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>			<u>11</u>
TOTAL	7	42	14	7	10			80

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
LOUISIANA	1	3		2	1			7
NEW MEXICO		1						1
CKLAHCMA	1	4	4					9
TEXAS	<u>9</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>			<u>46</u>
TOTAL	11	22	14	8	8			63

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS


<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA	2	4						6
FLORIDA					1			1
GEORGIA	5	15	7	2	8			37
N. CAROLINA	10	24	7	3	6			50
S. CARCIINA	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>			<u>10</u>
TOTAL	18	46	16	6	18			104

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CONNECTICUT					1			1
MARYLAND	3	4	5	4	3			19
MASSACHUSETTS	2	5		2				9
NEW JERSEY	3	7	1		1			12
NEW YCRK	1	5	4	2	1			13
PENNSYLVANIA		1						1
VIRGINIA	6	20	22	9	12			69
WASHINGTON, DC	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>			<u>18</u>
TOTAL	16	45	40	19	22			142

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS		1	3	3	2			9
INDIANA		3		17	17			37
KANSAS	2	6	3	4				15
KENTUCKY	4	12	3	2	2			23
MISSOURI	1	5	3	1	2			12
OHIO					1			1
TENNESSEE					1			1
WISCONSIN	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>			<u>1</u>
TOTAL	7	27	12	28	25			99



NO AUTHORIZATIONS

LESS THAN 1% OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

Figure A.7 Journalism Battalion Regions.

**TABLE VIII**  
**DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS BATTALION**

1. This battalion consists of personnel in MOSs 74D (Computer/Machine Operator), 74F (Programmer/Analyst), and 74Z (Data Processing NCO).
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from 11.1 percent (South Central) to 46.1 percent (Northeast). Three of the regions fail to meet the guidelines of 15 percent of the CONUS authorizations.
3. Because of the disproportionate number of authorizations in the Northeast, there are serious problems. In this battalion, more than 40 percent of E4 through E9 authorizations are in this region, the bulk of them involved with computers in Virginia. Because of the high cost of living associated with this area, it is envisioned that junior enlisted personnel would not seek repetitive reassignments to this region. The authors perceive this would result in a constant stream of requests seeking transfer out of the Northeast Region. This constant turmoil would fail to produce the atmosphere conducive to the development of the desired strong bonds of esprit and cohesion.
4. Consequently, it is recommended this battalion not be subdivided into regions.

# Data Processing Equipment Operations Battalion

## CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	44	50	73	51	33	7	4	262
SOUTH CENTRAL	35	37	71	46	31	12	5	237
SOUTHEAST	46	72	101	69	49	14	5	356
NORTHEAST	53	131	267	289	194	42	12	988
NORTH CENTRAL	<u>27</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>299</u>
CONUS TOTAL	205	323	574	552	366	94	28	2142

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	21.5	15.5	12.7	9.2	9.0	7.4	14.3	12.2
SOUTH CENTRAL	17.1	11.5	12.4	8.3	8.5	12.8	17.9	11.1
SOUTHEAST	22.4	22.3	17.6	12.5	13.4	14.9	17.9	16.6
NORTHEAST	25.9	40.6	46.5	52.4	53.0	44.7	42.9	46.1
NORTH CENTRAL	13.2	10.2	10.8	17.6	16.1	20.2	7.1	14.0

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST	16.8	19.1	27.9	19.5	12.6	2.7	1.5
SOUTH CENTRAL	14.8	15.6	30.0	19.4	13.1	5.1	2.1
SOUTHEAST	12.9	20.2	28.4	19.4	13.8	3.9	1.4
NORTHEAST	5.4	13.3	27.0	29.3	19.6	4.2	1.2
NORTH CENTRAL	9.0	11.0	20.7	32.4	19.7	6.4	0.7
CONUS	9.6	15.1	26.8	25.8	17.1	4.4	1.3



# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA	8	18	23	20	8	1	4	82
CALIFORNIA	12	12	30	15	10	3		82
COLORADO	3	2	6	7	4	1		23
UTAH			1					1
WASHINGTON	<u>21</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>74</u>
TOTAL	44	50	73	51	33	7	4	262

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
LOUISIANA	2	5	4	3	2	2		18
NEW MEXICO	1	1	16	7	1			26
OKLAHOMA		1	4					5
TEXAS	<u>32</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>188</u>
TOTAL	35	37	71	46	31	12	5	237

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA	5	11	14	5	1			36
FLORIDA			15	13	9	1	1	39
GEORGIA	23	36	45	35	25	9	2	175
N. CAROLINA	17	24	26	15	12	4	2	100
S. CAROLINA	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	46	72	101	69	49	14	5	356

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MARYLAND	5	19	37	27	12	2	1	103
MASSACHUSETTS	1	5	7	5	2	1		21
NEW JERSEY	3	4	12	18	16	3		56
NEW YCRK	3	8	9	17	8	3		48
PENNSYLVANIA	5	4	5	6	5	1		26
VIRGINIA	35	83	181	201	137	28	11	676
WASHINGTON, DC	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>58</u>
TOTAL	53	131	267	289	194	42	12	988

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS		3	22	26	19	3	1	74
INDIANA	7	8	12	39	22	7	1	96
IOWA						1		1
KANSAS	9	8	14	9	4	2		46
KENTUCKY	11	13	10	14	12	2		62
MINNESOTA						1		1
MISSOURI	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	27	33	62	97	59	19	2	299

AD-A139 943

AN EVALUATION OF WHETHER THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM SHOULD  
AND/OR COULD BE AP. (U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
MONTEREY CA D E OLIVER ET AL. DEC 83

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A



NO AUTHORIZATIONS

LESS THAN 1% OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS

Figure A.8 Data Processing Equipment Operations Battalion Regions.

**TABLE IX**  
**PERSONNEL BATTALION**

1. This battalion consists of soldiers with MOSS 75B (Personnel Administration Specialist), 75C (Personnel Management Specialist), 75D (Personnel Records Specialist), 75E (Personnel Actions Specialist), 75F (Personnel Information Systems Management Specialist), and 75Z (Personnel Senior Sergeant) .

2. Total CONUS authorizations range from a low of 17.0 percent in the West to a high of 23.2 percent in the Southeast. This is an even distribution, as all regions exceed 15 percent of the CONUS authorizations.

3. Distribution by grade is also very even. There are no problem areas until the grade of E9, where the bulk of the authorizations for this grade are at the Pentagon and Military Personnel Center. Soldiers should be able to remain in their region through the grade of E8.

4. It is recommended this battalion be subdivided into the regions indicated.

# Personnel Battalion

## CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	320	379	426	197	223	40	24	1609
SOUTH CENTRAL	435	477	500	229	241	51	24	1957
SOUTHEAST	418	530	595	250	311	71	29	2204
NORTHEAST	279	424	520	280	432	81	72	2088
NORTH CENTRAL	<u>291</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>393</u>	<u>239</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>1632</u>
CONUS TOTAL	1743	2142	2434	1195	1494	308	174	9490

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	18.4	17.7	17.5	16.5	14.9	13.0	13.8	17.0
SOUTH CENTRAL	25.0	22.3	20.5	19.2	16.1	16.6	13.8	20.6
SOUTHEAST	24.0	24.7	24.4	20.9	20.8	23.1	16.7	23.2
NORTHEAST	16.0	19.8	21.4	23.4	28.9	26.3	41.4	22.0
NORTH CENTRAL	16.7	15.5	16.1	20.0	19.2	21.1	14.4	17.2

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST	19.9	23.6	26.5	12.2	13.9	2.5	1.5
SOUTH CENTRAL	22.2	24.4	25.5	11.7	12.3	2.6	1.2
SOUTHEAST	19.0	24.0	27.0	11.3	14.1	3.2	1.3
NORTHEAST	13.4	20.3	24.9	13.4	20.7	3.9	3.4
NORTH CENTRAL	17.8	20.3	24.1	14.6	17.6	4.0	1.5
CONUS	18.4	22.6	25.6	12.6	15.7	3.2	1.8

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

STATE	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA	27	42	51	15	15	8	4	162
CALIFORNIA	127	154	172	76	78	16	10	633
COLORADO	102	98	105	63	63	10	6	447
OREGON			1		2			3
UTAH		2	7	2	6			17
WASHINGTON	<u>64</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>347</u>
TOTAL	320	379	426	197	223	40	24	1609

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

STATE	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARKANSAS		1	1	1	1			4
LOUISIANA	71	67	72	35	42	5	4	296
NEW MEXICO	7	9	12	6	4	1	1	40
OKLAHOMA	86	81	79	35	40	8	2	331
TEXAS	<u>271</u>	<u>319</u>	<u>336</u>	<u>152</u>	<u>154</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>1286</u>
TOTAL	435	477	500	229	241	51	24	1957

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

STATE	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA	29	46	52	31	36	4	4	202
FLORIDA		4	7	6	3	2		22
GEORGIA	160	193	244	96	124	38	13	868
MISSISSIPPI		1			3			4
N. CAROLINA	169	215	221	73	98	17	8	801
S. CAROLINA	<u>60</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>307</u>
TOTAL	418	530	595	250	311	71	29	2204



# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

STATE	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CONNECTICUT			1		1			2
MARYLAND	41	75	110	50	49	15	5	345
MASSACHUSETTS	36	43	53	23	26	6	1	188
NEW HAMPSHIRE					1			1
NEW JERSEY	69	99	75	45	50	6	5	349
NEW YORK	8	8	24	12	9	4		65
PENNSYLVANIA		8	11	6	11	1		37
VIRGINIA	102	148	199	122	266	38	56	931
WASHINGTON, DC	23	43	47	22	18	11	5	169
WEST VIRGINIA	---	---	---	---	1	---	---	1
TOTAL	279	424	520	280	432	81	72	2088

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

STATE	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS	9	18	56	31	27	9	2	152
INDIANA	18	28	20	49	52	15	11	193
IOWA			1		4			5
KANSAS	83	81	80	45	49	11	3	352
KENTUCKY	138	160	148	84	92	15	7	644
MICHIGAN		5	4	1	3	1		14
MINNESOTA		1	1		1	2		5
MISSOURI	43	38	70	28	49	12	2	242
NEBRASKA			1		1			1
OHIO		1	7	1	6			15
TENNESSEE			1		1			2
WISCONSIN	---	---	4	---	2	---	---	6
TOTAL	291	332	393	239	287	65	25	1632



**TABLE X**  
**BAND BATTALION**

1. This battalion is comprised of all soldiers in CMF 97 (Bandsmen).
2. Total CCNUS authorizations range from 8.6 percent (West) to 49.8 percent (Northeast). Three regions have less than 15 percent of the CONUS authorizations.
3. The Northeast is grossly disproportionate because virtually all MCS 02Ss (Special Bandsperson) are authorized in this region. If the 02S authorizations are excluded, then there is a fairly good distribution among the regions.
4. Since the authors have recommended that bands are use unit replacement and homebasing, it would not be sensible to also use regional basing. Therefore, it is recommended that this battalion not be subdivided into regions.

# Band Battalion

## CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	4	46	48	49	13	5		165
SOUTH CENTRAL	7	68	69	72	18	6		240
SOUTHEAST	12	76	79	106	33	14	1	321
NORTHEAST	14	70	92	370	218	135	52	951
NORTH CENTRAL	<u>6</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>231</u>
CONUS TCIAL	43	331	355	661	299	166	53	1908

## PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WEST	9.3	13.9	13.5	7.4	4.3	3.0		8.6
SOUTH CENTRAL	16.3	20.5	19.4	10.9	6.0	3.6		12.6
SOUTHEAST	27.9	23.0	22.3	16.0	11.0	8.4	1.9	16.8
NORTHEAST	32.6	21.1	25.9	56.0	72.9	81.3	98.1	49.8
NORTH CENTRAL	14.0	21.5	18.9	9.7	5.7	3.6		12.1

## PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>
WEST	2.4	27.9	29.1	29.7	7.9	3.0	
SOUTH CENTRAL	2.9	28.3	28.8	30.0	7.5	2.5	
SOUTHEAST	3.7	23.7	24.6	33.0	10.3	4.4	0.3
NORTHEAST	1.5	7.4	9.7	38.9	22.9	14.2	5.5
NORTH CENTRAL	2.6	30.7	29.0	27.7	7.4	2.6	
CONUS	2.3	17.3	18.6	34.6	15.7	8.7	2.8

# WEST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARIZONA	2	12	11	11	3	1		40
CALIFCENIA	2	20	18	20	6	2		68
COLORADO		9	8	9	2	1		29
WASHINGTON	<u>-</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>-9</u>	<u>-2</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>28</u>
TOTAL	4	46	48	49	13	5		165

# SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
LOUISIANA		11	12	13	3	1		40
CKLAHCMA	3	11	11	11	3	1		40
TEXAS	<u>4</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>160</u>
TOTAL	7	68	69	72	18	6		240

# SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALABAMA	5	25	20	22	6	2		80
GEORGIA	4	30	42	65	21	10	1	173
N. CAROLINA		8	7	9	3	1		28
S. CAROLINA	<u>3</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>40</u>
TOTAL	12	76	79	106	33	14	1	321

# NORTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MARYLAND	2	12	11	53	45	36	16	175
MASSACHUSETTS	2	12	11	11	3	1		40
NEW JERSEY	4	24	22	22	6	2		80
NEW YORK	3	11	25	50	28	13	6	136
VIRGINIA	3	11	23	234	136	82	29	518
WASHINGTON, DC	—	—	—	—	—	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	14	70	92	370	218	135	52	951

# NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>E3</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ILLINOIS	2	12	11	11	3	1		40
INDIANA	1	13	11	11	3	1		40
KANSAS		5	12	9	2	1		29
KENTUCKY	2	28	22	22	6	2		82
MISSOURI	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>40</u>
TOTAL	6	71	67	64	17	6		231



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